Fordham Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 4

Article 12

1977

The Future of Nonguaranteed Bond Financing in New York
Michael D. Utevsky

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael D. Utevsky, The Future of Nonguaranteed Bond Financing in New York, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 860
(1977).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol45/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE FUTURE OF NONGUARANTEED
BOND FINANCING IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

New York City narrowly escaped municipal bankruptcy in 1975 when it
could not service its debt1 without help from the state and federal governments. 2
New York State's Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was in default on
short-term notes for several days in February-March 1975, until the state
legislature appropriated $90 million for repayment of principal and interest
and for current operating expenses. 3 Bond markets were severely shaken by
New York's financial crisis. States and municipalities nationwide experienced
difficulty
in marketing their obligations, regardless of their individual credit
4
ratings.
The crisis was largely due to the seemingly unsupportable debt burdens on the
state, the city and their various authorities and agencies. 5 For example, about
$1.7 billion, or 58.6 percent of New York City's real property taxes, was used to
service the city's debt in fiscal 1974-75.6 Total outstanding debts of the state,
including commitments to its agencies, stood at $12.8 billion, or $707 per state
resident, on March 31, 1975. 7 More than two-thirds of this amount, or $8.7
billion, was "nonguaranteed" debt 8 which had never been submitted to a voter
1. The terms "debt" and "indebtedness" are subject to various definitions depending on the
jurisdiction and the context in which they are used. Broadly, the terms refer to an undertaking to pay
a specified amount at a future date. For a discussion of different interpretations of the terms in the
context of government obligations, see 15 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 41.18 (3d ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as McQuillin].
2. See F. Ferretti, The Year the Big Apple Went Bust 327-406 (1976).
3. New York State Moreland Act Commission on the Urban Development Corp. and Other State
Financing Agencies, Restoring Credit and Confidence 201-02 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Moreland
Commission Report].
4. Revzin, Other Cities Suffer Pains in Bond Market from New York Woes, Wall St. J., June 19,
1975, at 1, col. 6.
5. Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3, at 9.
6. City of New York, Official Statement, General Obligation Serial Bonds 28 (July 1, 1976). It
should be noted that the city is limited in levying real property taxes for municipal purposes to 2.5% of
full market value. N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 10(f). However, taxes used for debt service are excluded
from this limitation. Id. § 11(a).
7. State of New York, Preliminary Official Statement, 7% Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes,
at F-10 (Aug. 19, 1976) [hereinafter cited as State Prospectus].
8. Id. The state classifies these nonguaranteed debts as "lease purchase" commitments, which
amounted to $3.6 billion, and "moral obligation" debts, which amounted to $5.1 billion. Id.
In a typical lease-purchase arrangement, the state enters into a long-term agreement to lease a
facility from one of its authorities. The state's rental payments generally are sufficient to enable the
authority to repay interest and principal on the bonds it issued to finance acquisition and/or
construction of the facility. Such lease commitments are considered executory obligations of the state,
rather than legal indebtedness within the meaning of constitutional prohibitions. See 1975 N.Y.
Comp. Ann. Rep., pt. 1, at 22-23; State Prospectus, supra note 7, at 61-62; McQuillin, supra note 1, §
41.16; Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limitations,
25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 377 (1957).
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referendum 9 and for which the state disclaimed legal liability.
By late 1976, however, an appearance of normalcy had returned to
municipal bond markets1 ° and to New York finances. The city had met its first
deadlines for repayment of state and federal loans. II The state's obligations were
again being purchased by private investors' 2-- there was even a market for the
moral obligation bonds of the state's Housing Finance Agency and Municipal
Assistance Corporation, albeit at high interest rates. 13 Although a court
decision 14 ordered the city to repay almost $1 billion of short-term notes,
government officials remained hopeful that fiscal solvency would be main-6
tained,' 5 possibly with help from the new administration in Washington.'
Financial collapse had been averted by a series of emergency maneuvers.
These included a moratorium on repayment of short-term city notes;17 creation
of a Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC)' 8 with power to issue bonds
against which the state pledged the city's sales tax and stock transfer tax;'

9

the

Moral obligation debts consist of bonds issued by an authority or agency of the state, on which the
state agrees to appropriate annually any money needed to make up deficiencies in the issuer's debt
service reserve fund. The state disclaims any legal liability for the bonds, but there is said to be a
moral obligation on the part of the legislature to make such appropriations. 1975 N.Y. Comp. Ann.
Rep., pt. 1, at 23-24; State Prospectus, supra note 7, at 62-63. See notes 109-11 infra and
accompanying text.
These statistics do not include other authority debts that are unsupported by the moral obligation
"makeup" clause. These other debts, however, are sometimes said to carry an implied moral
obligation of the state for their repayment in event of default by the issuing authority. See notes 74-80
infra and accompanying text.
9. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 11, requires that debts guaranteed by the state's full faith and credit be
approved by a majority of voters at an election.
10. Bonds issued by other states and municipalities were being purchased by investors at
increasingly lower interest rates and higher prices. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1976, at D3, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1976, at D9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1976, at 33, col. 3; Wall St. J., June
25, 1976, at col. 1.
11. E.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1976, at 43, col. 1.
12. E.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1976, at 16, col. 1.
13. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (tax-exempt Housing Finance Agency bonds paid
8.5% interest); N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1976, at Al, col. 3 (tax-exempt MAC bonds paid 10.25%
interest).
14. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). See notes 131-136 infra and accompanying text.
15. E.g., New York City Mayor Beame's assertion that"we've met the problem wvith confidence,
in full control of the situation." N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1976, at 43, col. 3.
16. See, e.g., President-elect Carter's promise to keep the city from bankruptcy. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
17. Emergency Moratorium Act for the Cityof New York, ch. 874, [1975 extra. sess.]N.Y. Sess.
Laws 22 (McKinney 1976), held unconstitutional, Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976) (see notes 131-36 infra and
accompanying text).
18. Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, ch. 168, [1975] N.Y. Sess. Laws 237 (McKinney), as
amended, ch. 169, [1975] N.Y. Sess. Laws 260 (McKinney).
19. Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, ch. 168, § 7, [1975]N.Y. Sess. Laws 2S6 (McKinney),
as amended, ch. 169, [1975] N.Y. Sess. Laws 260 (McKinney). This pledge, however, does not create
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purchase by state and city pension and workmen's compensation funds of large
amounts of obligations of the state, MAC, and several state authorities; 20 and a
21
state appropriation of $750 million to the city and MAC.
At the same time, the legislature began to take steps to limit the amount of debt
that could be undertaken in the future. The city's ability to sell bonds to the
22
public was placed under control of the Emergency Financial Control Board.
Dollar ceilings were placed on the amount of moral obligation debt that could be
undertaken by the state's public authorities. Unused moral obligation provisions
in legislation governing six authorities and agencies were repealed. A Public
Authorities Control Board was created to oversee future authority bond issues
23
and, for some authorities, all new construction projects.
Of equal significance were two 1976 decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals which, although involving forms of guaranteed debts, demonstrated
the court's willingness to invalidate financing practices which strain constitutional debt limitations. In March, 1976, Wein v. State24 upheld one of the
emergency measures enacted by the state, but attempted to set definite limits
on the kinds of financing devices that could be used in the future-to delineate what Chief Judge Breitel called "the brink of valid practice. ' 25 The
following November, in Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 2 6 the court held unconstitutional the state-enacted moratorium on repayment of full faith and credit city short-term notes.
Whether these efforts of the court and legislature will have any long-term
effect, however, is problematic. When the financial crisis of 1975 begins to
any legal obligation on the state legislature to appropriate the tax revenues so pledged Into the debt
service fund. See Municipal Assistance Corp., Preliminary Official Statement, 1976 Series CC
Bonds, at 10-11 (Oct. 29, 1976).
20. Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, ch. 868, §§ 7-8, [1975 extra. sess.l N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1421 (McKinney), as amended, ch. 870, [1975 extra. sess.] N.Y. Sess. Laws 1444
(McKinney); Act of March 12, 1976, ch. 32, [1976] N.Y. Sess. Laws 148 (McKinney), as amended,
Act of April 6, 1976, ch. 115, [1976] N.Y. Sess. Laws 325 (McKinney); Act of June 10, 1976, ch 342
[1976] N.Y. Sess. Laws 906 (McKinney). Based on its findings of a public emergency, the legislature
passed these acts to aid financial recovery. Under normal economic circumstances, as one
commentator has observed, "purchase of tax-exempt securities by a tax-exempt organization Is
irrational." J. Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments 205-06 n.22 (rev. ed. 1969).
21. Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, ch. 868, §§ 22-23, [1975 extra sess.I
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1438 (McKinney), as amended, ch. 870, [1975 extra. sess.] N.Y. Sess. Laws 1444
(McKinney), held constitutional, Wein v. State, 39 N.Y.2d 136, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225
(1976) (see notes 122-30 infra and accompanying text).
22. Emergency Financial Act for the City of New York, ch. 868, § 2, [1975 extra. sess.] N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1409 (McKinney).
23. Acts of March 15, 1976, chs. 38-39, [1976] N.Y. Sess. Laws 158 (McKinney). Creation of
such a board was one of the major recommendations of the Moreland Commission Report, supra note
3, at 20-36. Similar recommendations were made by the state comptroller, 1975 N.Y. Comp. Ann.
Rep., pt. 1, at 40-43.
24. 39 N.Y.2d 136, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976). See notes 122-30 infra and
accompanying text.
25. Id. at 142, 347 N.E.2d at 588, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
26. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
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recede in the memories of New York's legislators, they will once again become
aware of their constituents' needs for low-cost housing, mass transportation, new
hospitals and schools, pollution control and electric power facilities, and other
projects of public benefit. The temptation to finance these projects through debt
will be strong, and the procedure of a public referendum for approval of full faith
and credit debts of the state will seem cumbersome and risky. 2 7 Conditions will
be ripe for new issues of nonguaranteed bonds, and for the invention of new
devices to circumvent constitutional debt limitations.
If this situation arises, how will the legislature react? Moreover, if the
legislature renews the practice of financing public works with nonguaranteed
debt devices, ana if this practice is challenged in court, how might the court of
appeals respond? Finally, if the court invalidates such debt financing devices,
what practical effect might such a decision have on public financing in New
York? These are the key questions that this Comment proposes to explore.
First, the development of general obligation and nonguaranteed debt
financing in New York will be reviewed, including the events that led to
enactment of constitutional limitations, subsequent legislative evasions of the
provisions, and judicial interpretations of the legislative actions.2 8 The next
section will examine the interplay between courts and legislatures in several
minority jurisdictions, where strict judicial construction of constitutional
limitations has repeatedly been overridden by legislative action.2 9 Finally, an
attempt will be made to indicate, on the basis of this investigation, whether
existing constitutional debt provisions are likely to be maintained successfully
by
30
judicial enforcement in the face of legislative attempts at avoidance.
II.

A.

NEW YORK'S EXPERIENCE

Origins of Constitutional Debt Limitations-And Ways Around Them

The New York Constitution appears to place severe restrictions on the power
of the state and its local governmental units to incur financial liabilities. The
state cannot give or loan its money or credit in aid of any private corporation or
undertaking, 31 nor extend its credit to a public corporation. 32 Nor can the state
contract a debt without approval by a majority of the legislature and by a
majority of voters at a general election. 33 Money raised by such a procedure can
by used only for the purposes specified by the legislature, and must be repaid
within 40 years. 34 A sinking fund must be maintained with yearly appropriations
adequate to pay interest and principal on state debts and the monies must be
27. In the November 1976 general election, for example, it was estimated that voters nationwide
approved only $1.5 billion of a proposed $3 billion of new bond issues. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1976, at
63, col. 5.
28. See section H infra.
29. See section III infra.
30. See section IV infra.
31. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 8.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 11.
34. Id. § 12.
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segregated from all other funds. 35 The state may, however, without 36a
and bond sales,
referendum, contract debts in anticipation of taxes, revenues
37
as well as to meet certain grave dangers to public safety.
Local governmental units face similar restrictions. "No county, city, town,
village or school district shall give or loan any money or property [or credit] to or
in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association . . . ." subject to
certain enumerated exceptions. 38 All debts contracted by such political subdivisions must be for a municipal purpose, repayable within 40 years, and
guaranteed by a pledge of the subdivision's faith and credit. 39 Subdivisions
cannot contract debt in excess of a specified percentage of the value of taxable
real estate within their boundaries.4 0
Forty-four states have enacted constitutional limitations on borrowing power
similar to some or all of New York's provisions; 4 1 two require greater-thanmajority votes of the legislature, and all others require either a referendum or a
constitutional amendment before the state can contract most forms of indebtedness. 4 2 Most of these debt limitations were developed in the middle to late
19th century, when many states found themselves overburdened with debts they
had incurred to help finance canal and railroad construction. The panic of 1837
resulted in several defaults by states on canal bonds. 43 Although not among the
defaulting states, New York at that time was pushed to "the very brink of default
on its bonds."' 44 During the latter half of the 19th century, several states and
45
municipalities also defaulted on bonds issued for railroad construction.
Rhode Island in 1842 and New Jersey in 1844 were the first states to try to erect
35. Id. §§ 15-16.
36. Id. § 9.
37. The enumerated crises are: "to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the state in
Id. § 10.
war, or to suppress forest fires .....
38. Id. art. VIII, § 1.
39. Id. § 2.
40. Id. § 4. Percentages range from 5% for school districts and 7% for villages to 10% for New
York City and Nassau County. Id.
Additionally, both the state and its subdivisions are prohibited from becoming liable for the
obligations of public corporations. Upon legislative authorization, however, they may take over the
corporations' properties and pay their debts. Id. art. X, § 5.
41. Wagner, Optimality in Local Debt Limitation, 23 Nat'l Tax J. 297, 297 (1970).
42. Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion
of State Constitutions, 68 Yale L.J. 234, 240-41 & n. 15 (1958). See also A.J. Heins, Constitutional
Restrictions Against State Debt 29 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Heins].
43. Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas and Indiana defaulted in 1841. Illinois, Michigan, Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Louisiana defaulted in 1842. Heins, supra note 42, at 7.
44. Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3, at 57. See also Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9, 85
(1852).
45. Typically, a state or municipality would exchange its bonds for stock in a railroad company.
The railroad would sell the government bonds to finance its construction projects. The company
would later become bankrupt, leaving the state or municipality with bonded indebtedness and
practically worthless railroad stock. See Willatt, Constitutional Restrictions on Use of Public Money
and Public Credit, 38 Texas B.J. 413, 414-16 (1975).
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constitutional barriers against the unchecked growth of state debt.4 6 New York
enacted its first such debt provisions in 1846 and gradually added to them at later
constitutional conventions. 47 Similar provisions were adopted in most states by
1890.48

Despite such restrictions, New York and many other states developed ways to
borrow money without referendum or constitutional amendment to finance a
variety of projects considered of social benefit.4 9 These devices are variously
called revenue bonds, improvement bonds, and special fund, or limited
obligation bonds. Interest payments on all these obligations are exempt from
federal 0 and state s" taxes. As opposed to the general obligation bond, on which
bondholders have recourse to the issuing government's general revenues and full
taxing powers, 52 all these devices are nonguaranteed: the issuing state or
municipality expressly disclaims any legal liability.5 3 Revenue bonds are,
typically, payable only from the revenues of the particular project they were
issued to finance. 54 Improvement bonds are issued by special districts (such as
water or sewer districts), and are payable from assessments on property
benefited by improvements in that district.5 5 Special fund, or limited obligation
bonds are payable from a special fund for debt service which the issuer agrees to
maintain. Sometimes, a specific tax is pledged to that fund, although the state or
municipality usually states that no liability is to attach to the government's
general revenues. 56 In certain instances, the state or municipality may contribute
to repayment of any of these bonds by leasing the facility that was built with the
bond proceeds.5 7 All such arrangements have been held by a majority of
46. Heins, supra note 42, at 8.
47. See Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as
Authorities, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 521, 526-52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Quirk & Wein]. The process of
amendment continued in New York through the 1938 constitutional convention, when article X,
section 5, was added as an express disavowal of the debts of public authorities. Id. at 561-79.
48. See Heins, supra note 42, at 93-120.
49. See, e.g., Foley, Some Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Municipal Financing of
Public Works, 4 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 26-27 & nn.68-70 (1935); Stober & Falk, Industrial
Development Bonds as a Subsidy to Industry, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 232, 232 (1969).
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103.
51. Interest on these bonds may be taxable unless specifically exempted by statute. 16 E.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 44.49 (3d ed. 1972). However, such exemptions are routinely
included in enabling legislation. See, e.g., N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 54 (McKinney 1976); N.Y.
Pub. Auth. Law § 1296(8) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
52. See 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Securities and Obligations §§ 13, 417 (1972).
53. E.g., N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 46(8) (McKinney 1976).
54. See McQuillin, supra note 1, at §§ 43.34,43.131; Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A
Discussion of Problems Related to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 Va. L. Rev. 285, 292-93 (1949).
55. See McQuillin, supra note 1, at §§ 43.45, 43.135; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Securities and
Obligations §§ 13, 418 (1972).
56. See McQuillin, supra note 1, at § 43.132; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Securities and Obligations
§§ 13, 416-17 (1972); Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion of Problems Related
to Municipal Bond Financing, 35 Va. L. Rev. 285, 291-92 (1949).
57. See Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 863,880-84 (1967);

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

jurisdictions not to create debts or liabilities within the meaning of constitutional
prohibitions.-"
However, there is often said to be a moral obligation on the part of the state or
municipality to repay the bonds from general revenues if the pledged refunding
source proves insufficient.5 9 This implicit moral obligation, noted as early as
1852,60 was made explicit in the so-called "moral obligation bond" developed in
1960. These bonds are issued by a public corporation created by the state; they
contain, in addition to an express disclaimer of liability by the state, a "makeup"
clause, which provides that the state shall make up any deficits in the reserve
fund maintained by the issuing agency for debt service. This clause has usually
been held to create a moral, but not a legal, obligation on future legislatures to
appropriate money needed by the agency. 6 1 For purposes of this Comment,
all forms of nonguaranteed debt described above will be termed revenue
bonds, except those containing a "makeup" clause, which will be called moral
obligation bonds.
The obvious advantages of these nonguaranteed financing devices are speed
and flexibility. Cumbersome and risky referendums are unnecessary, and a
public authority can move rapidly to take advantage of new federal grants
63
62
Constitutional debt ceilings also can be ignored.
and other opportunities.
Additionally, when tax-exempt bonds are used to finance industrial development and water pollution control projects, they offer financing 64to private industry at lower interest rates than could be obtained elsewhere.
Among their disadvantages are the slightly higher interest rates needed to
attract the investing public. 65 Another difficulty is the lack of government
control over the amount of debt incurred by authorities and over the uses to
which the money is put.66 Despite these disadvantages, nonguaranteed
bonds
67
have become an increasingly popular method of public financing.
Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 377 (1957).
58. Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion
of State Constitutions, 68 Yale L.J. 234, 240-43 (1958).
59. See B.U. Ratchford, American State Debts 517-23 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Ratchford].
60. "No one acquainted with the history of the legislation of this state can doubt that money
borrowed under the act of 1851, if applied to the completion of the canals, would be repaid on the
ground of this moral obligation ....
Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 9, 93 (1852). See also id. at 102-03
(Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 114-15 (Edmonds, J., concurring).
61. See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
62. Ratchford, supra note 59, at 512.
63. Id. at 516.
64. Willatt, Constitutional Restrictions on Use of Public Money and Public Credit, 38 Texas B.J.
413, 413-14 (1975). See also Ritter, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Municipal Obligations:
Industrial Development Bonds, 25 Tax Law. 511, 514 (1972).
65. Heins, supra note 42, at 36-68. See also Hollman & Primeaux, An Examination of Debt
Ceilings as Barriers to Efficient Debt Management, 25 Ala. L. Rev. 417 (1973).
66. Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3, at 4; Ratchford, supra note 59, at 515.
67. See table showing growth of nonguaranteed debt as a proportion of total state and local debts
in J. Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments 261 (rev. ed. 1969).
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The Development of Revenue Bond and Moral Obligation
Bond Financing
i.

REVENUE BONDS

One of the first attempts by a state to evade a constitutional debt limitation
was made in 1851, when the New York legislature authorized $9 million of
"canal revenue certificates" to finance the enlargement of the Erie Canal, and the
construction of the Genesee Valley and Black River canals. 68 The certificates
were payable out of a special fund maintained by surplus revenues
from canal
70
operations, 69 and the state disclaimed any liability on them.
In Newell v. People, 7 ' the court of appeals held the law a violation of an 1846
constitutional provision that authorized further canal construction to be
financed only from the prior fiscal year's surplus canal revenues. 7 2 This
provision had been added by the Constitutional Convention of 1846 as an
expression of73fiscal caution: debt reduction was given priority over canal
construction.
The court warned that the state's disclaimer of liability would be practically, if
not legally, ineffective in event of default, since the state would in all probability
honor its moral obligation to holders of the certificates. 74 Significantly, however,
the majority opinion invalidated the act only due to the specific constitutional
provision relating to canal construction. 7 s The court did not decide whether the
arrangement created a prohibited state debt.
Many years later, in People v. Westchester County National Bank,7 6 the court
of appeals again noted the policy rationale for the constitutional prohibitions:
[G]reat expenditures may be lightly authorized if payment is postponed. To place the
68. Act of July 10, 1851, ch. 485, [1851] N.Y. Laws 911.
69. Id. §§ 3-4.
70. Id. § 14.
71. 7 N.Y. 9 (1852).
72. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 3 (1846) (omitted from N.Y. Coast. (1938)).
73. See 7 N.Y. at 85-86.
74. Id. at 93. See also id. at 102-03 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 114-15 (Edmonds, J.,
concurring).
75. Id. at 93. Colorado was the first jurisdiction to hold that such bonds, payable only from canal
revenues, did not create a constitutionally prohibited debt of the state. In re Canal Certificates. 19
Colo. 63, 34 P. 274 (1893). Perhaps the furthest early extension of this reasoning was State ex rel.
Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929), appeal dismissed sub nom. Johnson v. State
Highway Comm'n, 281 U.S. 691 (1930), in which a highway bond issue, payable in the first instance
from a gasoline tax and guaranteed secondarily by a pledge of the state's faith and credit was held not
to create a state debt. See Ratchford, supra note 59, at 448-54.
76. 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241 (192 1). The case involved a proposed $45 million bond issue to
pay bonuses to World War I veterans who were residents of New York. The court held that the bonus
was a constitutionally prohibited gift to private individuals, rather than the performance of a moral
obligation, on the grounds that the veterans were servants of the federal government, not of the state,
and that their war victory was only of incidental benefit to the state. Id. at 479-81, 132 N.E. at
246-47.
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burden upon our children is easy .... Conscious of this human weakness, to guard against
7
public bankruptcy the people thought it wise to limit the legislative power.

Soon thereafter, the court held in Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State78 that
the state did, in fact, have both a moral obligation to repay water commission
bonds on which it had disclaimed any legal liability, and the power to honor this
obligation. The court found that the state's involvement in the financing
arrangement had induced sufficient reliance on the part of the bondholders to
create a moral obligation of the state. 7 9 However, the court noted that the
legislature had great discretion in deciding whether to honor its moral
obligation.80
These early decisions appear to have had little effect in deterring New York
from using nonguaranteed bonds with increasing frequency. Issuance of such
bonds was spurred by the development of public authorities as mechanisms for
public works finance. 8 1 The Port of New York Authority, formed in 1921, is
considered the first modern public authority.8 2 It was created initially to solve
jurisdictional problems of a port operating in two states (New York and New
Jersey), but the advantages of such a corporate
entity for nonguaranteed public
83
works finance soon became manifest.
77. Id. at 474-75, 132 N.E. at 244.
78. 243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926). The act creating the commission, with power to issue
bonds and to take private lands for its use, had been held constitutional in State Water Supply
Comm'n v. Curtis, 192 N.Y. 319, 85 N.E. 148 (1908). Although the Curtis decision dealt primarily
with the commission's power to initiate condemnation proceedings, it noted that the act "nowhere
assumes to pledge the credit of the state or any political subdivision thereof." Id. at 328, 85 N.E. at
151.
79. 243 N.Y. at 245-47, 153 N.E. at 63. The state's involvement was said to consist of initiation
and approval of the plan, and representation by a state agency of the future value of lands to be
improved. Id.
80. Id. at 244-45, 153 N.E. at 62-63. For other examples of the court's reluctance to upset a
legislative decision to honor a moral obligation, see Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Canal Bd., 204 N.Y. 471,
97 N.E. 964 (1912); Town of Guilford v. Board of Supervisors, 13 N.Y. 143(1855). Contra, People v.
Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 132 N.E. 241 (1921) (see note 76 supra).
81. A public authority is a corporation, authorized for a public purpose by the state legislature,
generally with power to take private land and to issue bonds to finance its projects. E.g., N.Y. Pub.
Auth. Law §§ 1450-69 (McKinney 1970). See Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52
Iowa L. Rev. 863, 884-85 (1967).
82. Council of State Governments, State Public Authorities 6 (1970); Morris, Evading Debt
Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 Yale
L.J. 234, 235 (1958). However, the first decision to uphold the bond issue of an organization similar to
an authority is said to be Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 A. 774 (1902).
83. Council of State Governments, State Public Authorities 6-9 (1970); Edelstein, The
Authority Plan-Tool of Modern Government, 28 Cornell L.Q. 177, 178 & n.6 (1943). During the
depression of the 1930's, the federal Public Works Administration (PWA) helped states draft
legislation to help stimulate construction projects. The bonds issued by the authorities were
purchased with federal funds by the PWA and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. See
Council of State Governments, supra at 9; J. Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments
199 (rev. ed. 1969). The number of states that authorized local governments to issue nonguaranteed bonds rose from 15 in 1931 to 40 in 1936. J. Maxwell, supra at 199. New York itself had 33
authorities by 1938, including ten in the New York City metropolitan area. Edelstein, supra at
177.
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In 1935, Robertsonv. Zimmernann8 4 confirmed that public authorities could
issue nonguaranteed bonds which did not fall within constitutional debt
restrictions. The court of appeals held that bonds issued by the Buffalo Sewer
Authority were debts of neither the city nor the state, and thus did not inflate the
city's debt beyond the prescribed percentage of assessed valuation of real
estate.85 Because the Buffalo Sewer Authority, like all other early public
authorities, was expected to be "self-liquidating"-that is, to repay its bonded
debts from surplus revenues without the aid of outside funds--the legislative
disclaimer of state or municipal liability for the bonds was held sufficient to make
constitutional debt limitations irrelevant.8 6 Moreover, the court
noted that the
87
authority was necessary to the public health and welfare.
In the last 25 years, however, the mechanism of public authority debt has been
used increasingly to finance projects that are not self-liquidating. While
disclaiming any legal liability, and making no commitment of its general funds,
the state or municipality agrees to help repay the debt from a specific revenue
source if the project's funds are insufficient. This pledge is usually considered
legally binding to the extent of that particular revenue source.8 8 Comereski v.
City of Elmira 9 upheld such an arrangement, whereby the Elmira Parking
Authority was created to build and operate parking lots, 90 and the city of Elmira
contracted to cover any deficits with up to $25,000 of revenues from its on-street
parking meters. 9' The arrangement was held not to create a debt of the state or
municipality, 92 but rather was found a constitutionally permissible gift of money
to a public corporation. 93 The court noted that such financing arrangements had
become common and essential to the needs of modem municipalities. 94 Thus, the
84.
85.

268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
Id. at 62-63, 196 N.E. at 743-44.

86.

Id. at 63, 196 N.E. at 744. See also Edelstein, The Authority Plan-Tool of Modern

Government, 28 Cornell L.Q. 177, 178 (1943).

87.
88.

268 N.Y. at 65, 196 N.E. at 745.
See note 56 supra and accompanying text.

89.
90.

308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1450-69 (McKinney 1970).

91. 308 N.Y. at 250-51, 125 N.E.2d at 241-42. The reasons for this unusual arrangement
were not explained in the record. Id. at 251, 125 N.E.2d at 242.
92.

308 N.Y. at 253-54, 125 N.E.2d at 243-44. A strong dissent found the arrangement

created both a debt of the city and an extension of credit. Id. at 255, 125 N.E.2d at 244 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
State courts are divided on the question of whether bonds secured by a specified government
revenue source, such as a gasoline tax, but not by the government's full taxing power, constitute

debts or obligations within the meaning of constitutional debt limitations. See recent discussions
in Secretary of Transp. v. Mancuso, 278 Md. 81, 359 A.2d 79 (1976); State ex rel. Ward v
Anderson, 158 Mont. 279, 491 P.2d 868 (1971). See also Annot., 100 A.L.R. 900 (1936).
93. Id. at 252, 125 N.E.2d at 242, citing Union Free School Dist. v. Town of Rye. 280 N.Y469, 474, 21 N.E.2d 681, 683 (1939), which distinguished gifts or loans of money or property to a

public corporation (permissible), from gifts or loans of credit to a public corporation (prohibited).
Any gift or loan of money or credit to a private corporation or individual is also prohibited

94.

"We should not strain ourselves to find illegality in such programs. The problems of a

modern city can never be solved unless arrangements like these . . . are upheld, unless they are
patently illegal." 308 N.Y. at 254, 125 N.E.2d at 244 (citation omitted).
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public necessity justification was extended from sewage treatment to parking
lots; and judicial approval of a nonguaranteed financing device was extended
from a self-sufficient authority to a partially subsidized one.
The reasoning of Comereski was ultimately extended to validate an authority
with no revenue sources of its own. 95 In May, 1974, early in the city's financial
crisis, the state legislature had created a New York City Stabilization Reserve
Corporation (SRC),96 which was authorized to sell bonds for the benefit of the
city. Although neither the state nor the city was liable for the debt, 97 the act
provided that the city would appropriate money annually to service the SRC
debt. 98 If the city failed to appropriate sufficient funds, the state comptroller
would make up the deficit from the "first monies available
to the city from the stock transfer tax fund" 99 and secondarily from other state
aid due to the city. 10 0
In Wein v. City of New York, 101 a 4-3 decision, the court of appeals relied on
Comereski to find this arrangement constitutional. Appropriations by the city
and state were held permissible gifts
to a public corporation, rather than legal
10 2
obligations of either government.
The SRC, however, unlike the Elmira Parking Authority, operated no
parking lots. In fact, as the court noted, "the SRC has no visible means of
financial support except for what it can derive from the city, State or Federal
governments."'10

3

While the majority brushed aside this distinction,

10 4

the

minority distinguished Comereski precisely on this ground: "[T]he parking
authority... had an ostensible purpose. It was not a mere financing device and
conduit for evasion of article VIII."'0 s The dissent took notice of New York's
dire need for funds during its financial crisis, but observed that "judicial
condonation of constitutional evasion only prolongs the agony of the cities by
postponing

1 06

. . .

a sensible reappraisal . . . of constitutional limits upon local

finance."'

95. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
96. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2530-50 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Included was a legislative
finding that "the city of New York is faced with a grave and unprecedented fiscal crisis which
threatens the city's ability to provide essential services and thereby endangers the welfare of all
the inhabitants .... ." Id. § 2533.
97. Id. § 2542.
98. Id. § 2537(c).
99. Id. § 2540(b)
100. Id. § 2540(c).
101. 36 N.Y.2d at 618-19, 331 N.E.2d at 518-19, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57. The court found
no violation of constitutional limits on amounts of permissible indebtedness that could be
incurred; nor did it find a contracting of debt by a municipality without a pledge of its faith and
credit; nor a gift or loan of money or credit to a private corporation; nor a gift or loan of credit to
a public corporation. Id.
102. 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
103. Id. at 617, 331 N.E.2d at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 623, 331 N.E.2d at 522, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 622, 331 N.E.2d at 521, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 559 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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ii.

MORAL OBLIGATION BONDS

By the time the dissent in Wein v. City of New York issued this call for a
reappraisal of constitutional debt limits,

0 7

the field of nonguaranteed public

finance had undergone 12 years of uninterrupted and unprecedented growth.' 08
Much of this growth can be attributed to moral obligation bonds.' 0 9 As noted
above, 1 10 their distinguishing feature is a "makeup" clause, which provides that
any deficit in the reserve fund set up by the public corporation to repay its debt
will be covered by state appropriations. I' Thus, the moral obligation implicit in
revenue bonds was converted to an express, although not a legally binding,
promise. New York's courts have not yet squarely addressed the meaning of the
makeup clause."12 However, several jurisdictions have held that it imposes
merely a moral obligation on future legislatures, and does not create a legal debt
3
or obligation within the meaning of constitutional prohibitions. "1
The moral obligation bond was first used in the New York State Housing
Finance Agency Act of 1960,' 14 after the state had experienced difficulty in
securing voter approval of guaranteed bond issues to finance low-income
("Mitchell-Lama") housing. "i5 In retrospect, it appears that the moral obligation
107. Id.
108. See 1975 N.Y. Comp. Ann. Rep., pt. 1, at 22-24.
109. Invention of this device is generally credited to John Mitchell, later attorney general of
the United States. Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3, at 109-10; Reilly & Schulman,
The State Urban Development Corporation: New York's Innovation, I Urban Law. 129, 135
(1969).
110. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
111. E.g., N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 47(l)(d) (McKinney 1976): "The chairman of the
agency shall annually . . . make and deliver to the governor . . . his certificate stating the

amount, if any, required to restore the capital reserve fund to the amount [necessary to service the
next year's debt payments] and the amount so stated, if any, shall be apportioned and paid to the
agency during the then current state fiscal year." See Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds- Illusion
or Security? 8 Urban Law. 54, 57-62 (1976).
112. However, the makeup clause was discussed in Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d
610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975); Matter of Smith v. Levitt, 37 App. Div. 2d 418,
326 N.Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 934, 287 N.E.2d 380. 335 N.Y.S.2d
687 (1972). See notes 180-83 infra and accompanying text.
113. Maine State Housing Auth. v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699 (Me. 1971);
Massachusetts Housing Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 249
N.E.2d 599 (1969); In re Advisory Opinion on P.A. No. 346 of 1966, 380 Mich. 554, 158 N.W.2d
416 (1969); Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970);
Johnson v. Pennsylvania Housing Fin. Agency, 453 Pa. 329, 309 A.2d 528 (1973); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 113 R.I. 586, 324 A.2d 641 (1974); State ex rel. West Virginia Housing
Dev. Fund v. Waterhouse, 212 S.E.2d 724 (W.Va. 1974); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59
Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).
But see Quirk & Wein, supra note 47, at 591 ("It requires a peculiar mind to draw a distinction
between a direct guarantee of the bonds and a guarantee of a fund out of which the bonds will be
paid.')
114. Act of April 18, 1960, ch. 671, [1960] N.Y. Laws 1945, codified as N.Y. Priv. Hous.
Fin. Law §§ 40-61 (McKinney 1976).

115.

Quirk & Wein, supra note 47, at 585-87.
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clause was the subject of a misunderstanding between the New York State
government, on the one hand, and the investment community on the other. The
legislature and the governor believed that all projects funded by the bonds would
be self-supporting, and that no appropriations by the state would ever be
necessary.' 16 The investment community believed the state had committed itself
as a guarantor of the bonds; therefore, investors purchased them
without regard
117
to the financial feasibility of individual building projects.
Moreover, no court test of the validity of the legislation was forthcoming.
Perhaps earlier decisions such as Comereski"18 discouraged such a challenge.
Another inhibiting factor was that taxpayer standing to sue the state on
constitutional issues was severely restricted until 1975.' 19
Recently, however, the legislation's practical effect-if not its precise legal
effect-has been made clear: in event of default by the issuing agency,
the state
120
will repay the debt in order to protect its own credit rating.
C. "The Brink of Valid Practice"
Against the background of controversy over the nature of moral obligation
bonds and public awareness of the huge debt burden facing the state, the court of
appeals recently rendered two decisions in which it attempted to restrict certain
financing arrangements. In Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 121 the court struck down one attempt to circumvent the faith and credit
requirement. In Wein v. State, 122 it indicated its willingness to invalidate other
financing devices which contravene constitutional debt limitations.
Wein v. State was an action by a taxpayer 1 23 challenging the constitutionality
of state appropriations of $250 million to New York City and $500 million to
116. Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3, at 4-5. "The perception of the bankers and
investors proved as a practical matter to be more valid than that held in Albany. For now if the
State is to preserve its credit, it must recognize the outstanding moral obligation bonds as in fact
State debt and stand behind these bonds." Id. at 5.
117. Id.
118. See notes 89-94 supra and accompanying text.
119. Taxpayers were granted standing in situations where denial of standing would prevent
judicial consideration of a law. Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372
N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975), overruling St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d
15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964). One month after this decision, the
legislature enacted a provision allowing citizen taxpayers to maintain actions against state
officials for illegal or unconstitutional use of state funds or property, but excepted challenges to
bond and note issues. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 827, [1975] N.Y. Sess. Laws 1307 (McKinney),
codified as N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 123-123j (McKinney Supp. 1976). The question whether this
law has any limiting effect on Boryszewski has not yet been addressed by the courts. For a
discussion of earlier difficulties in challenging public finance legislation, see Quirk, Standing to
Sue in New York, 47 St. John's L. Rev. 429, 433-38 (1973).
120. See note 116 supra. See also Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security? 8
Urban Law. 54 (1976).
121. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
122. 39 N.Y.2d 136, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976).
123. Taxpayer-plaintiff Leon E. Wein, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, was also
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MAC. Repayment was secured by one-year city and MAC notes, and by an
assignment of all city mortgages. Secondary security was provided by state aid
funds pledged to the city.1 24 The appropriations were funded by the sale of
short-term revenue-anticipation notes by the state.1 2 The court found the
appropriations were constitutionally permissible gifts or loans of money to a
municipality and a public corporation, and not impermissible extensions of
credit. 126 However, after a discussion of the history and purposes of constitu-

tional debt limitations, the court stated that in order to prevent the imposition of
a debt burden on future generations, the state notes would be valid only if issued
27

"authentically in anticipation of actually committed taxes or other revenues."'

Thus, there must be a balanced state budget out of which the notes would be
retired. Any "rollover" of the notes would be constitutionally impermissible. 12 8
The court therefore found the device legal "so long as the fiscal prospects are
129
tenable."

In a warning that presaged the Flushing National Bank decision, Chief
Judge Breitel stated for the majority that
the ingenuity of man can devise at least a verbalistic escape from [constitutional]
limitations .... But there must be a point, a determinable point, at which an otherwise
plausible manipulation may and will be recognized and declared to be the doing indirectly
130
of that which is forbidden to be done directly ....

In FlushingNational Bank, Chief Judge Breitel, again writing the majority
opinion, held that the state could not constitutionally allow a moratorium on
repayment of a local government's faith and credit obligations. 31 Because New
co-plaintiff in Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1975) (see notes 95-106 supra and accompanying text), and co-author of Quirk & Wein, supra
note 47. See Adams, New York's Financial Gadfly, Wall St. J., May 4, 1976, at 22, col- 4
124. Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, ch. 868, §§ 22-23, [1975 extra. sess.]
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1438 (McKinney), as amended, ch. 870, [1975 extra. sess.] N.Y. Sess. Laws
1457 (McKinney).
125. 39 N.Y.2d at 141, 347 N.E.2d at 587, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
126. Id. at 140, 347 N.E.2d at 587, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 226. Although the state notes sold to
fund the appropriation represented an extension of credit, the issuance and sale of these notes
were separate transactions from the gift of the sale proceeds to the city. Moreover, such
short-term borrowing in anticipation of revenues is permitted by article VII, section 9, of the state
constitution. Id.
127. Id. at 147, 347 N.E.2d at 591, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 230, relying on People v. Westchester
County Nat'l Bank, 231 N.Y. 465, 474-75, 132 N.E. 241, 244 (1921).
128. 39 N.Y.2d at 149-51, 347 N.E.2d at 593-94, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33
129. Id. at 151, 347 N.E.2d at 594, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 233. According to State Prospectus,
supra note 7, at 5, "[tjhe implication of [Wein v. State] appears to be that if a court were to hold
that there was a tenable basis for the certificates . . . . the Notes would be valid even if the
ultimate result for the 1976-77 fiscal year is a deficit; if, on the other hand, a court were to hold
that there was no tenable basis for such certificates, some or all of the 1976-77 Notes... would
be held to be invalid. In such event, the result is not certain but some or all of the principal of,
and interest on, some or all of the 1976-77 Notes . . . might be non-recoverable."
130. 39 N.Y.2d at 149, 347 N.E.2d at 593, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
131. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 732-33, 358 N.E.2d 848, 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (1976).
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York's constitution requires that a municipality pledge its faith and credit for the
repayment of debts, 132 "the city is constitutionally obliged to pay and to use in
good faith its revenue powers to produce funds to pay the principal of the notes
when due. 1 33 The majority held that the state cannot evade this requirement
through the mechanism of a moratorium. 134 Moreover, the fiscal emergency was
held insufficient justification for the suspension of the faith and credit
provision, 135 although the fiscal situation did constrain the court from granting
36
immediate injunctive relief.1
In summary, although early decisions by the New York courts showed a
reluctance to approve revenue bond issues, they evinced a greater reluctance to
upset legislative interpretations of constitutional provisions. Thus, the state
gradually developed revenue bond financing devices, while the courts warned of
their dangers. By 1935, the court was ready to accept a public authority-one
that was self-supporting and performed a public purpose-as an essential part of
society. The court later approved a succession of financing devices, each more
sophisticated than the last, until 1976, when events created a renewed public and
judicial awareness of the dangers of debt financing. Wein v. State and Flushing
National Bank, while they deal with guaranteed bonds and notes, reflect this
awareness. In these two decisions the New York Court of Appeals demonstrated
its willingness to limit the use of new and more elaborate financing methods.
III.

PROCESS OF JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT
IN MINORITY JURISDICTIONS

Despite the New York Court of Appeals' two recent rulings on the

constitutionality of debt financing devices,' 37 it remains uncertain whether
courts can provide an effective mechanism for restricting such practices in the
future. In examining this question, it is instructive to review the experience of
those jurisdictions in which courts have invalidated as unconstitutional certain
forms of guaranteed and, especially, nonguaranteed debt financing.
Although the majority of jurisdictions have repeatedly approved such

practices, the courts of several states have attempted to limit their use through
narrow interpretations of constitutional debt limitations. Such decisions have
been based chiefly on two grounds: (1) that the proposed arrangement creates a
debt, liability or extension of credit, within the meaning of constitutional
132. N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
133. 40 N.Y.2d at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
134. Id. at 732-33, 358 N.E.2d at 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The court declined to reach the
question of whether the moratorium violated the impairment of contracts clause of the U.S.
Constitution, art. I, § 10. Id. at 740, 358 N.E.2d at 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 28. The impairment
clause was held not to bar a mortgage moratorium enacted by Minnesota during the depression of
the 1930's. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See discussion of this
clause in Flushing Nat'l Bank, 40 N.Y.2d at 749-57, 358 N.E.2d at 860-65, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
34-40 (Cooke, J., dissenting).

135.
136.
137.

40 N.Y.2d at 740-41, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
Id. at 741, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
See section II(C) supra.
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proscriptions; or (2) that the arrangement primarily aids a private individual or
enterprise, rather than the public.
Significantly, however, these decisions have been negated in most instances by
a pattern of legislative redrafting or constitutional amendment which has
eventually resulted in issuance of the bonds for the desired projects. Thus, the
courts have succeeded only in slowing the implementation of financing devices,
or in altering their character slightly-not in preventing their ultimate use.
A.

Minority Interpretations of Debts, Liabilities and Credit
i.

REVENUE BONDS

The great majority of jurisdictions have held that revenue bonds, payable
solely from the revenues of a specified project or agency, and for which the state
or municipality disclaims any legal obligation, do not create state or municipal
debts, liabilities or loans of credit, within the meaning of constitutional
prohibitions.1 38 A minority of states have held to the contrary.
In State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 139 the Ohio Supreme Court held that revenue
0
bonds constituted gifts or loans of credit by the state to private borrowers.14
Although the revenue bonds did not create a state "debt," the court reasoned that
the money raised through their sale was state money. Thus, loans of the funds
14 1
constituted loans of the state's money and credit.
One year later, the state adopted a constitutional amendment permitting
the use of revenue bonds to provide guaranteed loans to private borrowers for
industrial development and pollution control.' 42 The court then upheld the
validity of the amendment and of a statute passed under it. 4
44
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 1
145
considered a law
under which a municipality proposed to issue revenue
bonds to finance the purchase of a slaughterhouse which would be leased
back to a private company for a rental sufficient to service the debt. This
arrangement was held invalid as a prohibited extension of credit to a private
138. See cases cited in McQuillin, supra note 1, § 43.34; Annot., 146 A.L.R. 328 (1943); SO
Wash. L. Rev. 440, 448 n.29 (1975).
139. 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
140. Id. at 46-48, 197 N.E.2d at 330-31, relying on dictionary definitions of 'credit." Ohio
Const. art. VIII, § 4 provides: "The credit of the State shall not, in any manner, be given or
loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever .

141.

176 Ohio St. at 51-52, 197 N.E.2d at 333.

142.

Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 13 (Supp. 1975).

143.

State ex rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp., 7 Ohio St. 2d 34, 218 N.E.2d

446 (1966). "This amendment has a single purpose, to allow the state and governmental
subdivisions to give financial assistance to private industry . . . in order to create new
employment within this state." Id. at 36-37, 218 N.E.2d at 449. See also State ex rel.
Eichenberger v. Neff, 42 Ohio App. 2d 69, 77-79, 330 N.E.2d 454, 460 (1974) ("Acts passed
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13, are specifically not subject to the requirements and

limitations of other sections of Article VIII ....
144.
145.

").

164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
Law of May 1, 1953, ch. 40, §§ 1-13, [1953] Neb. Laws 133 (repealed 1961).
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corporation. 146 The court reasoned that although liability on the bonds was
limited to revenues from the facility, the fact that the municipal bonds
provided an advantage to the company over private financing arrangements
47
meant that the city's credit was being extended.
Three years later, the voters approved a constitutional amendment which
permitted municipalities "to acquire, own, develop, and lease real and
personal property suitable for use by manufacturing or industrial enterprises
and to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost .... "148 The
legislature then passed an act authorizing municipal funding of an industrial
49
development project in language closely following that of the amendment. 1
The court reluctantly upheld the law' 50 as being, for the most part, 151 within
the scope of the amendment.
Idaho, formerly one of the most restrictive minority jurisdictions, has,
through a process of constitutional amendment and judicial re-interpretation,
changed its approach considerably since the often-cited case of Feil v. City of
Coeur d'Alene.15 2 In Feil, the Idaho Supreme Court considered an agreement
by the city of Coeur d'Alene to purchase a waterworks system from a private
company in exchange for bonds that the company would then sell to investors. The city promised to service the debt out of a special fund maintained by
revenues from its operation of the waterworks. 15 3 The court held that the
revenue bonds created a "liability" of the city, in violation of the Idaho

constitution,

54

through the city's pledge to operate the water system in such a

146. 164 Neb. at 226-27, 82 N.W.2d at 271-72. Neb. Const. art. XIII, § 3, provides that
"[tihe credit of the state shall never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, association, or
corporation . . . ." The Beck court reasoned that a prohibition against the state would also apply
to the state's political subdivisions. 164 Neb. at 225, 82 N.W.2d at 271. Thus, in many instances,
distinctions between actions by a state and actions by a municipality are not relevant.
147. 164 Neb. at 226-27, 82 N.W.2d at 271-72. The court also found that the arrangement
was for a private purpose, and only of incidental benefit to the community. Id. at 228-29, 82
N.W.2d at 272-73. See discussion of the public purpose doctrine in section III(B) infra.
148. Neb. Const. art. XIII, § 2.
149. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1614 to -1623 (1974).
150. State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962).
"While we may still feel the financing of private enterprises with public funds is foreign to the
fundamental concept of our constitutional system, . . . the constitutional prohibition has been
removed by amendment and it is now a part of our fundamental law." Id. at 206, 113 N.W.2d at
70.
However, in Chase v. County of Douglas, 195 Neb. 838, 850, 241 N.W.2d 334, 341 (1976), the
court held that the 1960 amendment expressed the "full measure" of exceptions to the general
constitutional debt prohibitions. It held that a law authorizing use of general municipal revenues
(as opposed to proceeds from revenue bonds) to purchase property for industrial development was
an invalid extension of credit to a private interest.
151. § 18-1621 was held unconstitutional in part on the ground that it did "not subject the
project to taxation to the same extent as private property, as required by the amendment." 173
Neb. at 206, 113 N.W.2d at 70.
152. 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912).
153. Id.at 38, 129 P. at 645.
154. Id. at 58-59, 129 P. at 652. The Idaho Const. art. VIII, § 3, provides: "[n]o . . .
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manner as to obtain sufficient funds for debt service.' - A later decision,
however, upheld the constitutionality of a municipal redevelopment authority
that had power to issue revenue bonds and to condemn land.' 5 6 The mechanism of a public authority was found sufficient to insulate the city from
liability.1 5 7 Additionally, the Feil court's interpretation of municipal liabilities
has been narrowed by a series of constitutional amendments that permit
municipalities to use revenue bonds for enumerated purposes.15s
In another line of decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court held in State Water
Conservation Board v. Enking 1s9 that a state authority's revenue bonds
created a prohibited liability of the state.160 However, a 1964 constitutional
amendment created a water resource agency with power to issue revenue
bonds.1 61 Following the amendment, the court observed in Idaho Water
Resource Board v. Kramer 62 that "the precedential value of Enking has been
totally eroded.' 63 Moreover, the Kramer court expressly overruled what
remained of Enking's interpretation of a liability, 164 holding that the water
resource board's revenue bonds did not create "an obligation [the state] is
65
bound in law or justice to perform."1
A clear pattern emerges from the foregoing cases. Even in those jurisdictions where courts have strictly defined debt, liability or credit, legislatures
have acted to protect their development plans by proposing constitutional
amendments. Nonguaranteed bonds appear to have become such an essential
part of modern public finance that states are unwilling to be deterred from
using such devices by adverse court decisions. Since Robertson v. Zimmermann 66 upheld the device, the question whether revenue bonds create
impermissible debts, liabilities or extensions of credit appears well settled in
New York. However, the pattern described above has significance in relation
to certain unanswered questions in the state, such as the legality of moral
167
obligation bond legislation.
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any
purpose, . . . without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors . ...
155. 23 Idaho at 52-53, 129 P. at 650.
156. Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972).
157. Id. at 884, 499 P.2d at 583.
158. See Idaho Const. art. VIII, § 3 (Supp. 1976).
159. 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936), overruled in part, State Dep't of Parks v. Department
of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974), overruled, Idaho Water Resource Bd. v.
Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976).
160. "Though disclaiming state liability, it is clearly the intention of the act to place the credit
of the state, morally and in some degree financially, back of this enterprise ...
5"
6 Idaho at
734, 58 P.2d at 783-84 (emphasis omitted).
161. Idaho Const. art. XV, § 7 (Supp. 1976).
162. 97 Idaho 535, 548 P.2d 35 (1976).
163. Id. at -, 548 P.2d at 58.
164. Id. at-,
548 P.2d at 55.
165. Id. at -, 548 P.2d at 56.
166. 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). There is dictum to the same effect in State Water
Supply Comm'n v. Curtis, 192 N.Y. 319, 328, 85 N.E. 148, 151 (1908). See note 78 supra.
167. See section MI(A)(ii) infra.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ii.

[Vol. 45

MORAL OBLIGATION BONDS

It is unclear whether the "makeup" clause in moral obligation bonds imposes
any greater obligation on the state, in event of default by the issuing agency, than
the "moral obligation" imposed by any other nonguaranteed bond.1 68 Most of the
jurisdictions which have considered the question have held that the makeup
clause creates neither a debt nor an obligation of the state, but is "intended only
to express to succeeding legislatures an expectation and aspiration that ' the
69
project might be found worthy of financial assistance, if later needed."'
170
In Gibson v. Smith,
however, an intermediate Oregon court held that the
language of the makeup clause in a housing finance act was an attempt to create,
indirectly, a state debt, in violation of the state constitution. 171 After the ruling,
the legislature amended the act to change the clause's language from "[t]he
amount so certified ...shall be appropriated by the Legislative Assembly,"'1 72 to
"[t]he amount so certified . . . may be appropriated by the Legislative
Assembly. ' 173 The Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the legislation, as
amended.1 74 It ruled that the clause did not create a175legal obligation and that the
constitution did not prohibit moral obligations.
In Casey v. South CarolinaState Housing Authority, 176 a form of makeup
clause that created a guaranty fund in a mortgage loan act was held by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina to pledge the state's "credit to make good any
deficit arising because of default .

. . . 177

The majority stated that although

168. See Griffith, "Moral Obligation" Bonds: Illusion or Security? 8 Urban Law. 54, 62-66
(1976). Indeed, it was the UDC's default on short-term notes that did not contain a makeup
clause which resulted in the New York legislature's appropriation of $90 million for the agency,
and which triggered the crisis of disillusionment over moral obligation bonds. Id. at 66. See note
3 supra and accompanying text.
169. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 429, 208 N.W.2d 780, 803 (1973). See
also cases cited in note 113 supra.
170. 531 P.2d 724 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975).
171. Id. at 727-28. Law of July 1, 1973, ch. 828, § 27(5), [1973] Ore. Laws 2460 provided: "if
the amount of money on deposit in the capital reserve account in any year is less than the debt
service reserves [needed], the administrator shall certify to the Governor the amount of such
deficiency . . . . [T]he Governor shall include in his next budget request to the Legislative
Assembly the amount certified . . . . The amount so certified . . . shall be appropriated by the
Legislative Assembly . ... "

Ore. Const. art. XI, § 7, provides that the legislature shall not lend the state's credit, nor create
state debts or liabilities of more than $50,000.
172. See note 171 supra (emphasis added).
173. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 456.720(5) (1975) (emphasis added).
174. Walsh Constr. Co. v. Smith, 272 Ore. 398, 537 P.2d 542 (1975) (en banc).
175. Id. at 404, 537 P.2d at 545. However, the court declined to indicate whether the result
would have been the same had the statutory language not been changed. Id. at 404-05, 537 P.2d
at 545.
176.

264 S.C. 303, 215 S.E.2d 184 (1975).

177. Id. at 313, 215 S.E.2d at 187. This clause differed from the typical clause in that it
provided that the state treasurer had a "mandatory and obligatory and enforceable" duty to cover
deficits by use of the guaranty fund; however, there was no legal obligation on the legislature to
make appropriations into the fund. Id. at 311-13, 215 S.E.2d at 186-87.
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future legislatures had no legal obligation to appropriate money into the
guaranty fund, there would be a "compelling desire" to protect the state's credit
by covering any deficit that might arise. 178 In this instance, the legislature
neither amended the constitution to permit use of a makeup clause, nor redrafted
the legislation to retain the substance of the clause in a more acceptable form.
1 9
Instead, the act was amended to eliminate the Guaranty Fund entirely. '
In New York, there is a paucity of rulings on the makeup clause. Matter of
Smith v. Levitt'8 ° and Wein v. City of New York' 8' both held that the express
disclaimer of liability in moral obligation legislation was sufficient to put the debt
outside constitutional prohibitions. Although neither case devoted extended
analysis to the network of the obligations created by the clause, Wein v. City of
82
New York held that appropriations under the clause were permissible gifts.'
Matter of Smith, however, noted that UDC bonds "might be classified as
contingent liabilities on the part of the State .... ,,t83 Neither case, however,
represented a direct challenge to the state on the nature of moral obligation
legislation. Since the two decisions, Boryszewski v. Brydges 8 4 has created a
basis for taxpayer standing for such a challenge, and it is possible that one will
soon be forthcoming.
B.

The Public Purpose Doctrine
Municipal bonds issued to aid industrial development or to build water
pollution control facilities for private industry are valid only if issued for a
"public purpose." Use of a government's taxing power for a purely private
purpose has long been held a violation of due process 8s and of state
constitutional debt limitations. 8 6 However, the distinction
between private and
8 7
public purposes has never been clearly delineated.'
A majority of jurisdictions have held that projects which aid the local
economy, increase employment, redevelop blighted neighborhoods or reduce
pollution are for valid public purposes, regardless of any incidental benefits that
178.

Id. at 313, 215 S.E.2d at 188.

179.

South Carolina State Housing Act of 1975, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-295.31 to .44 (Supp.

1975), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Reith v. South Carolina State Housing Auth., S.C. -, 225 S.E.2d 847 (1976).
180. 37 App. Div. 2d 418, 326 N.Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y 2d 934,
287 N.E.2d 380, 335 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1972).
181.

36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 618-19, 331 N.E.2d at 518-19, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57.
37 App. Div. 2d at 421, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975). See note 119 supra.
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
E.g., Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila..

21 Pa. (9 Harris) 147 (1853).

187. "A slide-rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot be formulated;
the concept expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge, and changing conditions." Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E,2d 745,
750 (1968). See McQuillin, supra note 1, §§ 39.19 to 39.27a; Comment, The "Public Purpose"
of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 70 Yale L.J. 789 (1961).
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may accrue to private industry. 188 Some states, however, have invalidated use of

the government's taxing power, or power of eminent domain, for similar
projects, on the ground that they are of direct benefit to private interests and of
only incidental benefit to the public. 189 The typical legislative response has been
the proposal of constitutional amendments which allow use of bonds for specific
purposes. 190 The courts appear to have construed such amendments as narrowly
as possible, upholding only those financing devices expressly permitted, and
adhering in all other situations to their prior interpretations of the intent of the
constitutional debt prohibitions. 191
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. North CarolinaIndustrial
Development FinancingAuthority, 192 scrutinized a public authority which had
been given the power to purchase industrial sites with proceeds from tax-exempt
revenue bonds, and to lease those sites back to private industry. 193 The majority
found that the practical effect of the legislation was to enable the authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain to benefit private industry. 194 The court
therefore held the scheme violative of the public purpose requirement of the state
constitution. 195
96
In 1971, the state legislature passed a similar bond act for pollution control. 1
188. E.g., Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960) (construction of manufacturing facilities); California Housing Fin. Agency v. Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575, 551 P.2d 1193, 131
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1976) (en banc) (loans to private builders of mixed income housing); Opinion of
the Justices, 358 A.2d 705 (Del. 1976) (state purchase of stock in a financially troubled bank);
State v. Jacksonville Port Auth., 305 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974) (construction of a warehouse for a
supermarket chain and a laundry for a linen supply company); State ex rel. Amemlyn v.
Anderson, Hawaii -,
545 P.2d 1175 (1976) (water pollution facility for electric utility
company); State ex inf. Danforth v. State Environmental Improvement Auth., 518 S.W.2d 68
(Mo. 1975) (en banc) (pollution control facilities); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., - Utah 2d -,
540 P.2d 499 (1975) (parking facility in area of urban redevelopment); Wisconsin Solid Waste
Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975) (authority empowered to
promote private waste recycling ventures). See also cases cited in Mitchell v. North Carolina
Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 148-50, 159 S.E.2d 745, 753-54 (1968); 50 Wash. L. Rev.
440, 448 n.28 (1975).
189. E.g., Nebraska, North Carolina and Washington. See notes 192-209 infra and accompanying text and note 147 supra.
190. See notes 192-209 infra and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192.
273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
193. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 123A-1 et seq. (1974).
194.
273 N.C. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 760.
195. Id. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761. The constitution provided: "The power of taxation shall
be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and shall never be
surrendered, suspended, or contracted away." N.C. Const. art. V, § 2(1).
The North Carolina court, however, has been liberal in other respects. For example, it held
that moral obligation bond legislation to finance low-income housing was for a public purpose
and did not pledge the credit of the state. Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29,
175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
196. Pollution Abatement and Industrial Facilities Financing Act, ch. 633, (1971] N.C. Sess.
Laws 588, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 159A-1 to -25 (1972), held unconstitutional, Stanley v.
Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
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The statute expressly provided that"[n]o Authority shall have any right or power
to acquire any property through the exercise of eminent domain."' 97 The court
found this exercise in draftsmanship unsatisfactory.' 98 If such financing
arrangements were found to be for a valid public purpose, the court reasoned,
subsequent legislatures would be free to repeal the clause prohibiting exercise of
eminent domain, and to allow local authorities to take private property for what
would then be considered public purposes. 199 In 1975, the legislature approved
the same legislation again, 20 0 this time accompanied by a proposed constitutional amendment that would authorize local authorities to issue revenue bonds
for industrial development and pollution control projects. 20 ' The amendment,
202
which also provided that the power of eminent domain could not be exercised,
20 3
How the court will construe the
was approved by voters in a 1976 election.
amendment remains to be seen.
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court held that the use of eminent domain
powers by a port district to take private lands for an industrial development
project was an unconstitutional use of those powers for a private purpose.2 0 4 In a
second decision, the court held that expenditures of public money by port
districts for "promotional hosting" of shippers and other potential port users was
an unconstitutional municipal "gift" to private individuals.20 s
In response to these decisions, a constitutional amendment was approved in
1966, which provided: "The use of public funds by port districts . . . for

industrial development or trade promotion and promotional hosting shall
be deemed a public use for a public purpose, and shall not be deemed a
gift ....,,206 The Washington court construed this amendment strictly, holding

that it permitted only those uses expressly described by the amendment.20 7 A
lease-financing arrangement, whereby two port districts agreed to use bond
proceeds to buy and lease-back pollution control facilities to private corpora197. Id. at [1971] N.C. Sess. Laws 588, 603.
198. Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
199. Id. at 36, 199 S.E.2d at 655. See generally 52 N.C.L. Rev. 859 (1974).
200. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 159C-1 to -26 (1976).
201. Law of June 25, 1975, ch. 826, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 1165, proposing N.C. Const. art.
V, § 8 (subsequently renumbered § 9 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
202. Id. The amendment provides: " 'Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the General Assembly may enact general laws to authorize counties to create authorities to
issue revenue bonds to finance, but not to refinance, the cost of capital projects consisting of
industrial, manufacturing and pollution control facilities for industry . . . and to refund such
bonds.
In no event shall such revenue bonds be secured by or payable from any public moneys
whatsoever, but . . . only from revenues or property derived from private parties ....
The power of eminent domain shall not be exercised to provide any property for any such
capital project.' "
203. See Editor's Note, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 159C-1 to -26 (1976).
204. Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) (en banc).
205. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 399 P.2d 623 (1965).
206. Wash. Const. amendment 45, adding art. VIII, § 8.
207. Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d 216, modifying 84
Wash. 2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974) (en banc), as modified, 533 P.2d 128 (1975). For a discussion
of the original holding, see 50 Wash. L. Rev. 440 (1975).
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tions for rentals sufficient to service the debt on the bonds, was held a loan of

money 208
that was "not . . . within the scope" of the constitutional amend209
ment.
In New York, although the public purpose doctrine received consideration in
some early cases, 10 it has drawn scant attention since the advent of modern
industrial development financing techniques. A few cases have considered the
question as it relates to functions of non-profit public corporations, 2 1 1 but not in
situations where private businesses would receive substantial benefits. The
major reason for the dearth of rulings on this issue is probably that most of New
York's bond legislation has not directly benefited private industry, except to the
extent that authority building projects provide lucrative contracts for private
construction firms. However, New York has several laws similar to the industrial development legislation in other states. Chief among these statutes is the
Job Development Authority Act. 21 2 The legislation was passed pursuant to a
constitutional amendment that permits the state, through a public corporation,
to "mak[e] loans to non-profit corporations to finance [industrial development],
including the acquisition of real property therefor ... to improve employment
opportunities in any area of the state .... ,,213 However, there has been no court
test to determine whether the actual operations of the authority21 4 conform to the
enabling language of the amendment or whether they would violate the public
purpose requirements of other constitutional provisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional provisions limiting state and municipal debt have not had their
intended effect. They were enacted in response to severe economic pressures
experienced by states in the 19th century as a result of the heavy debt burden
incurred to help finance canal and railroad expansion. Despite the intent of these
constitutional provisions, states continued to favor bonded indebtedness as a
means of public works financing and began to develop nonguaranteed financing
devices to circumvent black-letter limitations. 21 5 Although the devices grew
208. 85 Wash. 2d at 219-22, 527 P.2d at 264-66. The court distinguished these arrangements
from "true lease agreement[s]." Id. at 223, 527 P.2d at 266-67.
209. Id. at 233, 533 P.2d at 130.
210. E.g., People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N.Y. 592, 612, 101 N.E. 766, 772 (1913);
Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Canal Bd., 204 N.Y. 471, 475, 97 N.E. 964, 965 (1912).

211. E.g., Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 254, 125 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1955);
Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 64-65, 196 N.E. 740, 745 (1935). See notes 84-94 supra
and accompanying text.

212. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1800-34 (McKinney 1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975, 1976).
See also N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 1950-69 (McKinney 1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975) (Troy
Industrial Development Authority); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 2300-38 (McKinney 1970), as
amended, (Supp. 1975) (Auburn Industrial Development Authority).

213. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 8(3).
214. Typically, the authority uses proceeds from bond sales to finance second mortgages to
private companies that are building new facilities. Unlike such arrangements in many other
states, the bonds are guaranteed by New York State.
215. As one commentator observed: "Debt limitations were adopted as a result of experience;
in principle they are not so 'archaic' as the financial methods which brought them into being.
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increasingly elaborate, they were consistently upheld by courts in a majority of
jurisdictions, including New York.
At the present time, there are no effective legal restraints to prevent a
recurrence of this pattern in New York. The seriousness of the state's recent
financial crisis will probably instill fiscal caution in the New York legislature for
some time to come. Already, new legislation has been passed which places limits
on future authority indebtedness;2 16 other measures may follow. But given the
ease with which existing constitutional limitations can be circumvented, the
advantages of tax-exempt nonguaranteed financing, and the present lack of
alternative methods of finance that would provide equivalent advantages, a
return by the state to previous financing practices remains a distinct possibility.
Furthermore, the tone of recent New York decisions, and the possibility of
further adverse holdings, may not be as significant as the legal and political
communities now believe. The experiences of minority jurisdictions where the
courts have struck down certain debt financing practices suggest that state courts
can have only a minimal effect in retarding or limiting the use of these devices.
Legislatures have regarded debt financing as an essential means of achieving
growth and development within the state. Where court decisions in some
jurisdictions held legislation unconstitutional, the desired financing was
achieved through either legislative redrafting or constitutional amendments
which carved out specific exceptions to the general prohibitions. 2 7 The process
of constitutional amendment, as a reflection of the people's will, is preferable to
mere legislative redrafting designed to side-step a particular judicial decision.
Nevertheless, in view of the inadequate restrictions currently imposed on
nonguaranteed financing mechanisms, it is unlikely that public debate can fully
apprise the people of the ultimate debt burden such an amendment could create
for themselves and future generations.
What appears to be needed is extensive reform of existing constitutional
provisions. Ideally, debt limitations should allow the state to secure necessary
financing quickly and flexibly, but would admit of strict enforcement, to ensure
prudent debt management. Additionally, the provisions should allow the public
a far greater measure of control over state indebtedness.
It is submitted that the following constitutional revisions would be most
effective in achieving the above goals: (1) repeal of the referendum requirement
for issuance of general obligation debts,2 1 8 to be replaced by a requirement of a
two-thirds vote of the legislature; (2) enactment of a requirement that the state
pledge its faith and credit for the repayment of all debts of the state and of its
public corporations;2 19 and (3) enactment of a ceiling on total state indebtedness,
The use of revenue bonds is not an attempt to adjust those limitations to present needs, but rather
to render them impotent by avoiding them entirely. Such action is a confession that we are not
willing to learn from experience." Ratchford, supra note 59, at 513.
216. Acts of March 15, 1976, chs. 38-39, [1976] N.Y. Sess. Laws 158, 181 (McKinney). See
note 23 supra and accompanying text.
217. See generally section III supra.
218. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 11.
219. This requirement would be similar to the present faith and credit requirement for debts
of local government units. Id. art. VIII, § 2.
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fixed at a percentage of either the market value of all taxable real property in the
state, or the total tax revenues received by the state. 220 Existing limitations on
local indebtedness should be retained in their present form.
Such measures would result in an end to the use of nonguaranteed debt and the
added interest costs it entails. Public authorities could be retained for their
original purpose of administrative convenience; but the political reality implicit
in authority debts-the state's ultimate liability in event of default-would be
legally recognized. Repeal of the referendum requirement would allow the
legislature the speed and flexibility necessary for public works financing.
Moreover, these proposals could be strictly enforced by the courts, with little
detriment to public financing programs.
Perhaps the greatest significance of these proposed revisions is that they would
provide the state legislature with full knowledge and control of total state
liabilities; this would, in turn, give the public greater influence over political
decisions involving further state debt increases. Debt statistics would no longer
be fragmented into such categories as guaranteed debts, authority debts and
moral obligation debts. Instead, there would be two easily ascertainable
amounts: total state debts and total local debts. It is submitted that such a clear
accounting system, in addition to direct legislative responsibility for all debts,
would result in an increase in public influence over state and local financing
policies. A well-informed public that is able to communicate its concerns to
elected representatives at the state and local levels would provide a better
safeguard against fiscal mismanagement than is now provided by the archaic,
easily-evaded referendum requirement.
Government officials and commentators have recommended similar, though
often less drastic, reforms. 22 1 It is not within the scope of this Comment to
analyze their proposals. Nonetheless, it is submitted that unless radical changes
are made in methods of debt financing, New York may well be destined to repeat
the patterns of the past.
Michael D. Utevsky
220. This debt ceiling would also follow the pattern of limits on local debts. Id. § 4.
221. See, e.g., Proposed N.Y. Const. arts. X-XII, in 12 Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of New York 26-46 (1967); Moreland Commission Report, supra note 3,
at 56-61; Bowmar, The Anchronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 863, 896-900
(1967); Hollman & Primeaux, An Examination of Debt Ceilings as Barriers to Efficient Debt
Management, 25 Ala. L. Rev. 417, 443-44 (1973).

